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Abstract
Background: This study aims to design an empirical test on the sensitivity of the prescribing doctors to the price
afforded for the patient, and to apply it to the population data of primary care dispensations for cardiovascular
disease and mental illness in the Spanish National Health System (NHS). Implications for drug policies are
discussed.
Methods: We used population data of 17 therapeutic groups of cardiovascular and mental illness drugs
aggregated by health areas to obtain 1424 observations ((8 cardiovascular groups * 70 areas) + (9 psychotropics
groups * 96 areas)). All drugs are free for pensioners. For non-pensioner patients 10 of the 17 therapeutic groups
have a reduced copayment (RC) status of only 10% of the price with a ceiling of €2.64 per pack, while the
remaining 7 groups have a full copayment (FC) rate of 40%. Differences in the average price among dispensations
for pensioners and non-pensioners were modelled with multilevel regression models to test the following
hypothesis: 1) in FC drugs there is a significant positive difference between the average prices of drugs prescribed
to pensioners and non-pensioners; 2) in RC drugs there is no significant price differential between pensioner and
non-pensioner patients; 3) the price differential of FC drugs prescribed to pensioners and non-pensioners is greater
the higher the price of the drugs.
Results: The average monthly price of dispensations to pensioners and non-pensioners does not differ for RC
drugs, but for FC drugs pensioners get more expensive dispensations than non-pensioners (estimated difference of
€9.74 by DDD and month). There is a positive and significant effect of the drug price on the differential price
between pensioners and non-pensioners. For FC drugs, each additional euro of the drug price increases the
differential by nearly half a euro (0.492). We did not find any significant differences in the intensity of the price
effect among FC therapeutic groups.
Conclusions: Doctors working in the Spanish NHS seem to be sensitive to the price that can be afforded by
patients when they fill in prescriptions, although alternative hypothesis could also explain the results found.
Background
In National Health Systems (NHS) with public funding
prescribing physicians can be considered as double
agents acting as patients’ advocates but also as society’s
gatekeepers of resource use. Public healthcare organiza-
tions -health authorities and managers- put pressure on
physicians to control pharmaceutical spending, and more
so the lower the patient co-payment. According to eco-
nomic theory [1], doctors are patients’ agents and as such
prescribe treatments that maximize the utility, effective-
ness and quality of care in the face of the patients’ prefer-
ences and economic and other restrictions. The
completeness of this agency relationship is the subject of
theoretical (multiple models of physicians’ behaviour,
and on the doctor-patient relationship) and empirical
debate. From a policy perspective, to investigate whether
prescribing doctors are sensitive to the price paid by
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ship) is an interesting topic because it enables foreseeing
of the impact and effectiveness of alternative pharmaceu-
tical cost-containment measures. If NHS doctors pre-
scribe cheaper, clinically equivalent medicines to patients
t h a th a v eac o - p a y m e n t ,t h i sm a yb es u g g e s t i v eo ft h e
proper functioning of the doctor-patient agency relation-
ship, but it could also be a symptom of an ex-post moral
hazard in the sense that when patients do not bear the
cost of treatment they receive the most expensive one,
not necessarily the most cost-effective [2].
The Spanish NHS is particularly suited to the empirical
study of this issue. One relevant characteristic of the
Spanish NHS is that Spain is divided into 17 autonomous
regions, known as “Autonomous Communities”,w i t ha
high degree of self-government, including the responsi-
bility for health care. Each Spanish regional government
manages a network of hospital and primary healthcare
centres which provide free inpatient care and consulta-
tions to about 97% of the population. These regional net-
works are organized into healthcare areas of variable size
(usually between 150,000 and 250,000 inhabitants) with
one acute public hospital and several primary healthcare
centres serving the population resident in a delimited
geographical territory [3]. Care in these services is free of
charge, with coverage extending to substantial pharma-
ceutical benefits: all medicines prescribed to pensioners
(eligible because of age, retirement from work or disabil-
ity) and underprivileged collectives are free of charge.
Relatives under the care of pensioners are also included
in the exemptions from payment status. The remaining
population, referred to in this study as “non-pensioners”
(in Spain, known as “active”) pay for only part of the
costs of medicines through a co-payment system with the
following characteristics: the general co-payment rate is
40% of the cost of the medication but in order to avoid
charging patients with unaffordable payments over long
time periods, long-term treatments for chronic condi-
tions are usually charged at only 10%, with a ceiling of
€2.64 (in 2010) per package (in Spain drugs are dispensed
in commercial packages, not in unitary doses customized
for each patient, and a separate prescription form must
be filled out for each package). The copayment status of
each drug is regulated by the Spanish Ministry of Health
and is mandatory for all Autonomous Regions. From
now on, we will refer to the drugs charged at the 40%
general rate as regular prescriptions or full-copayment
(FC) drugs, and we will call those drugs with 10% co-pay-
ment (up to €2.64) reduced co-payment (RC) drugs.
Family physicians in the Spanish NHS are paid by sal-
ary with small variable incentives -different between
regions- depending on achievement of goals (including
prescription of generic or equivalent but cheaper drugs)
and workload. The drugs prescribed by NHS doctors are
dispensed in private pharmacies at fixed prices regulated
by the Spanish government. The list of drugs (brand
names and presentations) that may be covered by NHS
has very few exclusions. The drugs financed, prices and
copayments are identical in all Autonomous Commu-
nities, and discounts are not allowed. There is a reference
pricing system for pharmaceuticals when the patent has
expired, but while in other countries the patient is
allowed to pay the difference between the reference price
and the price of the prescribed drug if the latter is higher,
in Spain the reference price system excludes drugs out-
side the reference threshold from public coverage, and
has resulted in uniformity of prices among brand name
drugs (with patent expired) and generics [4].
All Spanish regions have the same regulation on prices
and copayments. The price of a particular drug presenta-
tion is the same throughout the country. As prices of
brand drugs (and generics) within a given therapeutic class
of drugs differ, geographical differences in the observed
average prices of prescribed drugs for a particular thera-
peutic class come from compositional differences: a region
where many doctors prescribe generics or cheaper drugs
will show lower average prices. As a result, in the Spanish
NHS the average price discrepancy for a therapeutic group
between two health areas is due to price differentials in
the shopping cart of dispensed drugs, which depends on
the choice between more expensive (i.e. brand name drugs
with patents in force) or cheaper drugs (i.e. generics) in
the corresponding therapeutic group.
The double differential copayment between groups of
patients (non-pensioners vs. pensioners) and between
drugs (40% copayment vs. 10% up to €2.64) allows the
designing of a test on the intensity of doctors’ sensitivity
to the price paid by their patients. If doctors do not take
into account the copayment that patients have to face,
they would be expected to prescribe at the same average
price for non-pensioners and pensioners. If the physician
were an agent acting on behalf of the Administration, he
would be mindful of public expenditure. Apart from that,
if the physician had incentives to limit the total cost of
prescribed medications, such as by being a factor in the
calculation of the physicians’ variable pay, then the average
price of drugs could even be higher for non-pensioners
than for pensioners in that doctors would be more con-
cerned to prescribe low cost drugs to pensioners because
they are charged to the NHS; and if doctors were con-
cerned about expenses to the patient’s pocket, then the
average price of regular prescriptions for non-pensioners
would be less than the average price for pensioners within
the same drug group, but no difference, or a small differ-
ence, would be expected for the average price of RC drugs.
This study aims to design an empirical test on the pre-
sence and intensity of doctors’ sensitivity to the price
paid by their patients, and to implement it with testable
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tions for cardiovascular disease and mental illness in the
NHS in Spain. We will also discuss the implications for
drug policies.
Methods
Population
The units of analysis were the 1424 observations derived
from multiplying the 17 therapeutic groups by the
healthcare areas [(8 cardiovascular groups * 70 areas) +
(9 psychotropic groups * 96 areas) = 1424] participating
in two previous research projects designed to describe
small area variations in drug utilization. From the first
project, on cardiovascular drugs, we use data on dispen-
sation and expenditure for 8 therapeutic groups in 70
healthcare areas from 5 autonomous communities for
2005 [5]. From the second project, on psychotropic
drugs, we obtained data on 9 therapeutic groups in 96
healthcare areas from 8 Autonomous Communities for
2006 [6]. In 2006, these areas had between 8,528 and
846,253 inhabitants, and globally the study population
of the second project was 24.9 million inhabitants (18,96
million non-pensioners and 5,94 million pensioners),
representing 56.4% of the Spanish population (47.7% in
the first project).
Sources of data
The data used in this study came from the claims that
the regions’ pharmacies submit to the respective Auton-
omous Community’s Health Departments on a monthly
basis. The data used in our study are propierty of the
respective Regional Health Departments and are not
publicly avalaible. Data were requested for the research
group and the Regional Health Departments transferred
them with the corresponding permission to use in the
Grupo de Investigación en Utilización de Medicamentos
en el Sistema Nacional de Salud (Drug Utilization in the
Spanish National Health System Research Group) pro-
jects. Among other data, these claims include informa-
tion about the drug dispensed (brand name,
formulation, dose, number of units per package, price)
and the coverage characteristics of the patient: pensioner
(free of charge) or non-pensioner (under the co-pay-
ment scheme). The claims do not include any patient
information about age, sex, diagnostic features or reason
for prescription. Since drug packages do not necessarily
contain the same quantities of drugs, prescribed quanti-
ties were transformed into defined daily doses (DDDs),
the amount that corresponds to the average mainte-
n a n c ed o s ep e rd a yf o ram e d i c a t i o nu s e di ni t sp r i n c i -
pal indication in adults, as established by the World
Health Organization’s Collaborating Centre for Drug
Statistics Methodology [7,8].
Pharmacological groups
The selection of pharmacological groups was opportunis-
tic, depending on the previous projects [5,6]. We
excluded three groups comprising virtually only one
medicine or marketed at an almost identical price (doxa-
zosin, digitalis, spironolactone) because in those cases
average prices could not be different. Table 1 describes
the 17 pharmacological subgroups included according to
the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classifica-
tion system. Ten of them are RC drugs and the remaining
7 are regular FC drugs. In both conditions, cardiovascular
and mental illness, medicines of both co-payment groups
coexist, allowing us to contrast our hypothesis. Fixed-
dose combinations were assigned following the ATC cri-
teria. Some of the drugs included (the anti-platelets
agents different to aspirin, such as clopidogrel) are sub-
ject to prior authorization requirements that include,
among other, age-related criteria.
Testable hypotheses
NHS doctors, as agents of their patients, look at the out-
of-pocket cost of treatment for patients. Therefore, we
expect no differences (or lower differences) in average
prices of RC drugs prescribed to pensioner patients and
to non-pensioner patients, while we expect a positive
average price differential for FC drugs, becoming greater
t h eh i g h e rt h ep r i c ei s .T h es p e c i f i ct e s t a b l eh y p o t h e s e s
include: H1A) In FC drugs (40% co-payment for non-
pensioners) there is a significant difference between the
average prices of drugs prescribed to pensioners and
non-pensioners; H1B) There is no significant price differ-
ential between pensioners and non-pensioners in RC
drugs, since both groups of patients are virtually exempt
from payment; H2) The price differential for FC drugs is
greater the higher the price of the drug is, after account-
ing for the clinical possibilities of substitution among
drugs within a therapeutic subgroup.
Analysis
From the DDD dispensed and the corresponding expen-
diture, we estimated the monthly average price of the
DDD dispensed to pensioners and to non-pensioners,
and the differential price between pensioner and non-
pensioner patients for each geographical area and phar-
macological subgroup (defined in Table 1). After a
descriptive analysis and bivariate tests of equality of
means, we carried out multivariate multilevel regressions
for the price differences between pensioners and non-
pensioners for therapeutic group j in area i, controlling
for the type of co-payment (FC vs. RC), with random
effects for the therapeutic group. Statistical comparisons
among models were based on the deviance [9]. We esti-
mated three models: Model 1, with random effects of the
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yH 1 B ,a n dM o d e l s2a n d3t e s tH 2 .M o d e l3g e n e r a l i z e s
Model 2, by including random effects of the therapeutic
group not only in the intercept but also in the slope of
the price. In Model 2, FC drugs have a price differential
between pensioner and non-pensioner patients that
increases linearly with price, while RC drugs do not have
such a differential between either groups of patients
because of the ceiling for RC medicines. Models were
specified as:
M1:DPij = β1FCj + β2RCj + uj0 + eij
M2:DPij = β0 + β3priceij ∗ FCj + uj0 + eij
M3:DPij = β0 + β3priceij ∗ FCj + uj0 + uj3priceij ∗ FCj + eij
where DP is the monthly price differential between
pensioner and non-pensioner patients, FC is a dummy
variable = 1 for regular drugs with co-payment of 40%,
RC is a dummy = 1 for the reduced co-payment drugs,
and price is the monthly price of a standard treatment
(DDD) in euros. We used Maximum Likelihood for esti-
mating the models, with Stata v11.0 (College Station,
TX, USA).
Results
Table 2 shows, for each pharmacological group, the quan-
tities dispensed, the monthly average price for pensioner
and non-pensioner patients, the differential price between
them and the percentage of areas in which the average
price for pensioners is higher than for non-pensioners.
Table 1 Description of pharmacological groups
Pharmacological
group
ATC codes Description Copayment
Cardiovascular groups
Beta-blockers C07A, C07B, C07C, C07D, C07F Beta blocking agents, plain and combined with thiazides, other diuretics,
and other antihypertensives.
RC
ACEIs & ARBs C09A, C09B, C09C, C09D ACE inhibitors, plain and combinations, Angiotensin II antagonists plain and
combinations
RC
Diuretics C03A, C03B, C03C, C03EA, C03EB Low-ceiling diuretics, thiazides or other, high-ceiling diuretics, and diuretics
and potassium-sparing agents in combination.
RC
Nitrates C01DA Organic nitrates. RC
Ca
++ channel
blockers
C08C, C08D Selective calcium channel blockers with mainly vascular effects and selective
calcium channel blockers with direct cardiac effects.
RC
Antiplatelet drugs B01AC04, B01AC06 Clopidogrel and acetylsalicylic acid (in dose of 100 mg) FC
Flavonoids C05CA03, C05CA04, C05CA05 Diosmin, troxerutin, hidrosmin. FC
Statines C10AA HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors (statines) FC
Psychotropic drugs
SSRIs N06AB, N06AX Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors and other antidepressants RC
Typical
antipsychotics (1st
generation)
N05AA, N05AB, N05AC, N05AD,
N05AF, N05AG, N05AK
Phenothiazines with aliphatic side-chain, piperazine structure or piperidine
structure, butyrophenone derivatives, thioxanthene derivatives and
diphenylbutylpiperidine derivatives
RC
Atypical
Antipsychotics (2nd
generation)
N05AE, N05AH, N05AL, N05AX Indole derivatives, diazepines, oxazepines, thiazepines, oxepines, benzamides
and other antipsychotics
RC
MAOIs N06AF, N06AG Non-selective monoamine oxidase inhibitors, monoamine oxidase A
inhibitors
RC
Lithium N05AN Lithium RC
Anti-dementia drugs N06DA, N06DX Anticholinesterases, and other anti-dementia drugs FC
Hypnotics N05CA, N05CB, N05CC, N05CE,
N05CD, N05CF, N05CM, N05CX
Barbiturates, plain and combinations, aldehydes and derivatives,
penzodiazepine derivatives, piperidinedione derivatives, benzodiazepine
related drugs, other hypnotics and sedatives, hypnotics and sedatives in
combination, excl. barbiturates
FC
Anxiolytics N05BA, N05BB, N05BC, N05BD,
N05BE, N05BX
Benzodiazepine derivatives, diphenylmethane derivatives, carbamates,
dibenzo-bicyclo-octadiene derivatives, azaspirodecanedione derivatives, and
other anxiolytics
FC
Psychostimulants N06BA, N06BX Centrally acting sympathomimetics and other psychostimulants and
nootropics
FC
ATC: Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical classification system; ACEI: angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors; ARB: angiotensin receptor blockers; SSRIs: Selective
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors; MAOIs: Monoamine oxidase inhibitors. Copayment: FC if non-pensioner patients pay a copayment of 40%, RC if non-pensioner
patients pay a reduced rate of 10% with a ceiling of €2.64 (all treatments are free for pensioners)
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of prescriptions higher for non-pensioners, and only one
of them (anxiolytics) is FC. Four of the 7 FC groups show
differentials higher than €1 between pensioner and non-
pensioner patients. Only 1 in 10 RC groups shows a differ-
ential higher than €1 between pensioner and non-pen-
sioner patients.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the monthly
price differential between pensioners and non-pensioners,
and the monthly price by copayment status. Two clusters
of RC drugs can be appreciated, one of a lower price (less
than €1 per day) and another of a higher price (stimulants,
anti-dementia drugs and atypical antipsychotics). Accord-
ing to our hypothesis, FC drugs (triangles in Figure 1)
show a positive price differential that increases linearly
with price, particularly in the case of stimulants and anti-
dementia drugs. On the contrary, and also as expected
according to our hypothesis, RC drugs (circles in Figure 1)
show cost differentials distributed around the zero value,
indicating that pensioners get more expensive drugs than
non-pensioners in some areas, while the opposite happens
in other areas.
The average monthly price of RC cardiovascular drugs is
higher than that of FC drugs (€14.4 vs. €12.4, p < 0.005),
b u tw ed i dn o tf i n ds i g n i f i c a n td i f f e r e n c e sa m o n gt h e
prices of RC and FC psychotropic drugs. The average
price differential among prescriptions to pensioners and
non-pensioners for RC drugs was €-0.43 per month, while
this differential for FC drugs was €10.8. The standard
deviation of the latter is high (€21.6). Only in 16 observa-
tions out of the 1424 was a negative price differential
higher than €5 observed. All the 16 are psycho-stimulants.
We found variability among areas in drugs’ average
monthly price, particularly for flavonoids (coefficient of
variation: 0.42). On the other hand, anxiolytics (low price)
and atypical antipsychotics (high price) show homoge-
neous prices among areas with a coefficient of variation
around 5%.
Table 3 shows the results of multilevel regression mod-
els M1 to M3. According to the M1 model, the monthly
average price of dispensations to pensioners and non-
pensioners is the same for RC drugs (the RC coefficient
is non significant). On the other hand, the FC dummy is
significant, indicating that pensioners get more expensive
dispensations than non-pensioners (a difference of €9.74
per month). The M2 model estimated a positive and sig-
nificant effect of the drug price on the differential price
between pensioner and non-pensioner patients. For FC
Table 2 Price and price differential between prescriptions for pensioners and non-pensioners by pharmacological
group.
Copayment DDD/1000/year Price month Price %
Pensioners Non-pensioners Pensioners Non-pensioners Diff. Areas
Cardiovascular groups
Beta-blockers RC 46.08 6.12 9.72 8.78 0.90 80.00
ACEIs & ARBs RC 326.47 29.99 14.34 13.81 0.54 68.57
Diuretics RC 113.47 6.74 5.66 5.40 0.26 41.43
Nitrates RC 53.21 0.82 11.90 12.02 -0.12 40.00
Ca
++channel blockers RC 109.35 6.73 17.85 15.89 1.96 98.57
Antiplatelet drugs FC 98.74 4.96 14.34 11.45 2.89 94.29
Flavonoids FC 44.06 3.45 7.95 8.46 0.50 50.00
Statines FC 187.18 17.70 19.84 18.29 1.54 98.57
Psychotropic drugs
SSRIs RC 98.72 21.99 26.32 26.11 0.21 34.38
Typical antipsych. RC 5.35 0.25 8.61 8.82 -0.21 39.58
Atypical antipsych. RC 18.71 2.23 125.24 130.57 -5.33 18.75
MAOIs RC 0.10 0.02 15.79 14.43 1.35 42.71
Lithium RC 1.02 0.28 5.62 5.80 -0.18 52.08
Anti-dementia FC 18.40 0.19 82.18 27.99 54.18 100.00
Hypnotics FC 69.04 6.04 3.20 3.05 0.14 84.38
Anxiolytics FC 124.34 19.66 4.46 4.74 -0.28 6.24
Stimulants FC 0.53 0.61 57.78 52.86 4.92 76.04
ACEI: angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors; ARB: angiotensin receptor blockers; SSRIs: Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors; MAOIs: Monoamine oxidase
inhibitors. Copayment: FC if non-pensioners pay a copayment of 40%, RC if non-pensioners pay a reduced co-payment of 10% with a ceiling of €2.64; DDD/1000/
year: Daily defined doses dispensed per 1000 people and year; Price: cost of one month of treatment; Price differences: between the monthly cost of treatment
between pensioners and non-pensioners; % areas: % of areas with monthly costs of treatment higher in pensioners than in non-pensioners.
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the differential by nearly half a euro (0.492). The random
effect of the pharmacological groups is less intense than
in the M1 model, but clearly significant with a
withinclass correlation of 48.9%. According to the
deviance test, the M2 model was superior to the M1
model. The M3 model, a generalization of M2 with ran-
dom effects on the price coefficient, does not improve
Figure 1 Differential of prices between pensioner and non-pensioner patients by copayment status and therapeutic group.A C E I :
angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors; ARB: angiotensin receptor blockers; SSRIs: Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors; MAOIs: Monoamine
oxidase inhibitors. Full co-payment drugs are represented as triangles and reduced copayment drugs are represented as circles.
Table 3 Factors explaining the monthly price differential between pensioners and non-pensioners dispensations.
Models M1 M2 M3
Variables fixed part: estimated coefficients and significance FC 9.74* ––
RC -0.32 ––
Price*FC – 0.4920** 0.4273**
Intercept – -1.71 -1.44
Random effects Withinclass correlation 77.2% 48.9% 61.6%
#
Var(U0) 143.7376 36.5447 58.3749
Var(U3) –— 0.0147
Var(e) 42.3655 38.1651 37.7826
Deviance (-2 Log L) 9399.3 9230.4 9228.8
Multilevel models.
n = 1413. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01;
# Estimated for the monthly average (€12.0). FC if non-pensioners pay a copayment of 40%, RC if non-pensioners pay a reduced
co-payment of 10% with a ceiling of €2.64.
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slope was non significant, indicating the absence of dif-
ferences among the FC pharmacological groups in the
intensity of the price effect.
Discussion
The results of this study show that dispensation data (a
feasible proxy of doctor prescriptions) are compatible
with our hypothesis on physicians’ behaviour. The more
expensive a drug is, the higher the price differential is
between dispensations to pensioner and non-pensioner
patients if non pensioners pay a 40% copayment, but
this differential is inexistent in drugs with a reduced
copayment, suggesting that Spanish NHS physicians are
sensitive to the price that their patients have to pay.
There are three pharmacological FC groups for which
the effect is clearer, because they include drugs of high
price and drugs of low price: antiplatelet agents (clopido-
grel vs. acetylsalicylic acid), statins (atorvastatin vs. sim-
vastatin and other statins) and anti-dementia drugs
(anticholinesterases and memantine vs. ginkgo biloba). In
these groups, doctors seem to differentiate prices and
predominantly prescribe low price drugs to non-pen-
sioners and high price drugs to pensioners. Therefore,
these groups have a positive price differential for pen-
sioners in almost all healthcare areas. However, doctors
do not seem to distinguish prices for non-expensive or
low-price drugs. For them, the differential effect is negli-
gible. One possible explanation for this behaviour is that
physicians only have an approximate knowledge of drug
prices. This explanation is consistent with a review of
physicians’ awareness of drug prices, showing a low cost
accuracy (31% of estimates were within 20% or 25% of
the true cost, and fewer than 50% were accurate by any
definition of cost accuracy) [10]. This result is also con-
sistent with a previous study for Spain. Spanish family
physicians were asked about the price of well-known
drugs. They estimated correctly (with an interval of 25%
around the real price) in 41% of cases. This study also
suggests that physicians tend to neglect price differences
between products of identical composition [11].
In contrast with the growth in the literature about (co)
payment effects on healthcare service utilization (quanti-
ties), empirical studies about the effects on prices are
scarce. Our study is consistent with those scarce antece-
dents, confirming that the selection of the prescribed
drug is influenced by the price that the patient pays (or
co-pays). Even in Japan, where physicians sell medicines
to the patients and have incentives to obtain higher mar-
gins with more expensive drugs, one study in antihyper-
tensive drugs found that “physicians are willing to give
up one dollar of their profit in order to reduce the co-
payment of non-elderly patients by 28 cents” [12]. In
Sweden, another study concluded that physicians
prescribed less expensive drugs (generics) to patients that
had to pay for them [2]. On the other hand, several stu-
dies using qualitative methods [13] or surveys [14-18]
have reported that physicians claim to consider out-of-
pocket costs a more important issue when prescribing
than the cost for the organization or for society (although
physicians -occasionally in the same studies- declare their
awareness of drug costs and that discussing the cost of
treatment with patients is very uncommon) [15,17-19].
Notably, the most likely strategy used to assist patients
burdened by their out-of-pocket costs is to switch the
patient from a brand name to a generic drug [20,21].
Going beyond the agency relationship, doctors’ price
sensitivity to their patients’ copayment scheme may be the
result of different causal mechanisms. First, pensioners are
older and probably sicker than non-pensioners, and occa-
sionally some expensive drugs could be more appropriate
for patients at higher risk (i.e., clopidogrel has a lower risk
of gastrointestinal bleeding than aspirin and could be a
better alternative for elderly people). Second, the pharma-
ceutical industry exerts strong promotional pressures on
doctors to prescribe new, more expensive drugs with a
patent in force. It is possible that marketing strategies
focus -at least in some cases- on older patients, contribut-
ing to higher prices (although these hypotheses cannot
explain the absence of differences in drugs with reduced
copayment). Third, in Spain general practitioners maintain
the prescription of medicines that have been indicated by
specialists (so-called “induced prescription”). Specialists
have different prescription patterns (with more innovative
and expensive drugs) and, also, treat more complex -and
probably, older- patients. Pensioners could be more
exposed to the “induced prescription” phenomenon than
non-pensioners and therefore receive more expensive pre-
scriptions. Finally, if patients with co-payment do not pick
up (selectively) the most expensive prescriptions from
pharmacies, we would be facing a problem of patients’
price sensitivity instead of physicians’ sensitivity to the
price that can be afforded by patients.
Limitations
Apart from contributing to the scarce literature on this
issue, our study has certain other strengths. We work with
population data and we include all the dispensations for
selected therapeutic groups for two common conditions.
The study also has several limitations. First, pensioners are
very different from non-pensioners in terms of age, disease
patterns and their severity, and these differences could jus-
tify differences in the choice of drugs and, therefore, in the
average price for pensioners and non-pensioners. The eco-
logical nature of the data does not allow consideration of
all the factors that influence medical prescriptions (disease
and its severity, other accompanying health conditions,
possible contraindications or interactions with other drugs
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Page 7 of 9that the person is taking alongside, and so on). But in our
study, average price discrepancy is measured within speci-
fic and relatively homogeneous therapeutic groups. In
most of these therapeutic groups, evidence of the superior-
ity of one drug over others in terms of higher price rarely
exists (i.e. atorvastatin vs. simvastatin, ARBs vs. ACEIs,
brand name vs. generic drugs, one atypical antipsychotic
vs. another atypical antipsychotics, and so on) and, with
some exceptions, there are no clinical reasons for the sys-
tematic use of high price drugs in pensioners and low
price drugs or generics in non-pensioners. Nevertheless, in
some cases the therapeutic groups are more heteroge-
neous, including medicines with different indication pro-
files (i.e. antiplatelet drugs or atypical antipsychotics). For
those groups including some medicines aimed at young
people and others aimed at older patients, the price differ-
ential could be a compositional effect not related with
doctors’ sensitivity to patient costs (i.e. requirements for
the prior authorization of clopidogrel consider age over 65
as a criterion; because people over 65 are mainly pen-
sioners with no copayment, we could find a compositional
effect in this therapeutic class).
Second, more severe patients may use stronger doses of
the same drug. Although strong-dose packages have a
higher price, the DDD metric oscillates between flat pri-
cing (equal for all presentations without considering the
number of units or their strength) and monotonic pricing
(the price of the DDD decreases with increasing units or
doses of the presentation). Because pensioners usually
consume presentations with higher doses and more units
per presentation, the DDD price is artificially lower in this
group, underestimating the copayment effect and underva-
luing the intensity of doctors’ sensitivity to patient costs.
Third, the Spanish regulation of prices and copayments
does not consider a reduced contribution for fixed-dose
combinations, even if both (or more) drugs of the combi-
nation separately have this consideration. As disaggregate
data of prescriptions within each group were not available
for this study, groups with fixed-dose combinations suffer
a miss-classification bias (i.e. a third of the dispensations
of inhibitors of the renin-angiotensin system group were
fixed-dose combinations subject to a general copayment of
40%, but they were classified as RC drugs). This bias also
underestimates the copayment effect and doctors’ sensitiv-
ity to patient costs. Nonetheless, Model 3 does not show
differences among pharmacological groups, suggesting
that doctors’ sensitivity to patient costs is independent of
the medicines used.
Finally, and probably the most important limitation in
our study, our conceptual framework attributes decisions
on prescriptions to physicians but uses dispensations
(prescriptions filled out) as a proxy of prescriptions
issued (which also includes unfilled prescriptions). The
patients’ ability to influence prescription decisions to
cheaper drugs is irrelevant to the agency theory (in fact,
if the agency relationship was complete, the decision
would always reflect the patients’ preferences), but
unfilled prescriptions overestimate doctors’ sensitivity to
patient cost effects, especially if patients do not pick up
the most costly medicines from the pharmacy. Some stu-
dies in the United States have shown that the drug aban-
donment rate increases as the out-of-pocket expenses
increase [22]. Although the generalization of these stu-
dies to the Spanish setting is uncertain, probably both
behaviours (patients’ price sensitivity and physicians’ sen-
sitivity to the price that can be afforded by their patients)
occur at the same time and both contribute to the price
differences between co-payment schemes detected in our
study. The nature of our data (dispensation, not prescrip-
tion) does not permit the estimation of the contribution
of each factor to the price differences found.
Implications
The policy implications of our findings for cost-contain-
ment are diverse. First of all, specific measures addressed
to patients (i.e. the use of reference prices as avoidable
copayments for pensioner and non-pensioner patients)
could be effective measures for increasing doctors’ pre-
scription of cheaper and generic drugs. Second, cost-con-
tainment policies could benefit from a better knowledge
of drug prices among physicians. Also, if our results are
related with the agency relationship, physicians’ incen-
tives to switch expensive medicines to cheaper equiva-
lents or generics should considerer physicians’ beliefs on
the clinical value of the cheaper ones relative to more
expensive drugs. Nevertheless, we need broader and dee-
per studies on cost-containment pharmaceutical policies,
and specifically on the agency relationship between phy-
sicians and their patients [23]. And, we evidently need
better data about costs and reasons for prescription
[23,24].
Conclusions
The main finding of our study is that patients receive
cheaper medicines when they have to pay the 40%
copayment. Although part of this effect can be due to
unfilled prescriptions (patients’ price sensitivity) and
other confounding factors, these results suggest that
doctors are sensitive to the out-pocket costs that their
patients have to bear, and that copayments, apart from
the well-known effects on quantities dispensed, also
influence the unitary costs of dispensed drugs.
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